John Donne (Holy Sonnets VII)
In his foreword to the final volume of the Official Medical History of the Second World War Sir Austin Bradford-Hill, quoted the well known truth, that throughout history, victory or defeat in war has often been swayed by disease. He also stressed that during the fateful years [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] , the prevention of illness had been one of the characteristics of the military medical services. There is little doubt that but for the prevention and control of malaria the decisive campaigns in the Far East would have been lost, with incalcuable consequences.
Many authors have described the role of malaria during the military operations of the past 50 years 1- 15 .
The present paper attempts to collect and consolidate some facts and statistical data which have now become available from British, Australian and American sources. The second aim is to compare the past malaria situation with the new problems and potential dangers that may become acute in case of any major conflict in tropical areas.
The latest volume of the History of the Second World War as seen mainly from the United Kingdom, deals with Casualties and Medical Statistics l6 . It brings together the details of specific causes of disease in various Services or Commands and indicates the enormous wastage of manpower due to illness. It also shows how essential is a good system of recording sickness or injury, and how important this knowledge is for epidemiology and preventive medicine. Naturally, no statistics can be complete under war conditions, but the lessons that those data teach are of enormous value.
Malaria emerges as having been one of the main causes of illness of troops during the Second World War in tropical areas; even in some Mediterranean zones with more equable climate, outbreaks of malaria during the transmisson season jeopardized several military campaigns3.17.18.
I. Malaria in the Second World War
A table based on data gleaned from Franklin Mellor'sl6 latest series of statistics covering the period [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] reveals the impact of malaria on the British and Commonwealth Forces (Table I) . However, these overall figures do not specify that in some British units on the Indo-Burma Front the malaria incidence in 1943 was as high as 1746 per 1000. In the Middle East some rates of admission for malaria ranged from a peak of 677 in 1940 to 380 per 1000 in 1945. In West Africa the rates were as follows: 762 in 1942, 442 in 1943, 278 in 1944 and 92 per 1000 in 1945.
Some comments on this table may be of interest: In North-West Europe malaria was reported at an equivalent annual rate of 13.8 per 1000 in July-September 1944 , but this figure fell to I. 9 per 1000 in OctoberDecember 1944. Statistics were broken down into indigenous malaria, viz. contracted in north-western Europe, and non-indigenous malaria occurring in men who have been exposed to it in other war areas. Obviously there was a great difference between them. While the former had in 1945 an estimated (or equivalent) annual rate of 1.3 per 1000, the latter was 9.7 per 1000. Most of the cases were due to "benign tertian" infections and falciparum malaria was rarely reported.
The North African and Central Mediterranean zone showed much higher incidence, though overall statistical data should be accepted here with caution because of the varying ethnic composition of troops and uneven degree of their exposure during the seasonal transmission of the infection. The dramatic story of the impact of malaria on the Italian campaign has been admirably told by Thompson 11 . The British Eighth Army faced an exceptionally severe challenge of malaria in Sicily, just before the invasion of the Italian mainland in the summer of 1943. In 1944 before the battle for Cassino about 8000 men were laid down with malaria contracted when passing through the Roman Campagna near Monte San Biagio. It is likely that the increase of malaria in that area was due to the deliberate destruction by the enemy of pumping installations which were part of the remarkably successful Italian drainage scheme of this formerly highly malarious area. The third mass infection of the British troops was in 1945 on the rice-growing plains of Lombardy near Ravenna 3 .
In the Middle East force a similar trend of malaria incidence with a peak level in 1944 was observed. Here once again the complex ethnic composition of troops (British, Indian, Canadian, South African, African, New Zealand) and some differences of reporting call for caution in accepting official figures. The high (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) per 1000) rate of PUO (pyrexia of unknown origin) as a diagnosis of convenience supports the suspicion that the true incidence if malaria was at least 25070 greater. The great differences of the incidence of malaria in different parts of the Middle East are shown in Table 2 .
Generally speaking the malaria incidence in this area was not unduly high; annual rates between 22-34 per 1000 were not alarming. Nevertheless, considering the fact that broadly speaking the Middle East had only a moderate malaria endemicity, these rates were disappointing. True enough there were some more malarious zones such as the Jordan Valley and coastal plains in Africa, former Palestine and Lebanon. The task of the Army was therefore to determine accurately the geographicallocation of the malarial zones. Initially three, but later two, malaria field laboratories were available for this work. Within a few months the main malaria surveys were completed. For such areas as a large part of the Lebanon and Syria these were pioneer studies. The malaria season was taken as covering the period from the beginning of April to approximately the middle of November, except in the Sudan and Eritrea where it continues throughout the year. The comprehensive malaria control organisation was designed to maintain constant observation on the ecology of the various anopheline vectors, develop new methods of control, undertake general anti-larval measures through special malaria control units, and train or supervise units in anti-mosquito and personal protection measures. Advisers at each Command Headquarters, local hygiene officers and sections, two malaria field laboratories and nearly thirty special malaria control units, employing large gangs of labourers, composed the special Middle East control organisation.
In India, where a tremendous amount of knowledge of malaria and a great experience of its control existed thanks to the decades of work of the Indian Medical Service and of research institutes in Calcutta, Delhi and elsewhere, the organisation of control activity in wartime was rapid 7 • Anti-malaria units (AMU) were formed and trained; their main task consisted of rapid reconnaissance of the epidemiological situation and advice on control measures. These units were to work in conjunction with field hygiene sections, whose resources were insufficient. The number of anti-malaria units was based not on the strength of the fighting forces but on the type of area into which the troops were likely to move. The usual allotment to an Army Corps was six AMUs, of which three remained as corps units and one was attached to each division. Another type of unit formed in India during the War was the Malaria Forward Treatment Unit (MFTU) which made it possible to treat severe cases as near the forward area as possible, so that evacuation of patients to a base hospital would not be called for and the men could soon return to their fighting units. The MFfUs were in fact small and lightly equipped 200 bed hospitals, where the time required in 1945 for successful treatment of a case of malaria was [8] [9] And yet, in spite of all this, the incidence of malaria I in the India Command was high throughout the period [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] . Table 1 indicates that the average ratio of malaria incidence between British Officers, Indian Officers, British Other Ranks and Indian Other Ranks I was 100:68: 160: 159. The difference between the first two groups may have been due to better malaria awareness among Indian officers, and their greater discipline, while the difference between the two groups of officers and the two groups of Other Ranks may be ascribed to the same factor in addition to greater exposure of the latter. Following the Japanese advance in South-East Asia and the withdrawal of the British and Indian troops along with some 500,000 civilians from Burma, the situation became grave as the 1943 annual sickness rate of the troops on the Indo-Burma Front rose to 1200 per 1000. The medical services were strained to their utmost capacity, as the daily number of malaria cases in [1943] [1944] was 5560 and 3606 respectively during several weeks.
The incidence of malaria in British and Indian troops was between 100 and 250 per 1000 per year. The death rate ascribed to this disease varied between 0.11 and 0.59 per 1000, the latter being a peak figure in 1942; the average malaria fatality rate was generally lower in Indian troops (0.21 per 1000) than in the British (0.23 per 1000).
The high relapse rate of vivax malaria gave rise to many problems; about 50 per cent of these cases relapsed either within the first three months or between the sixth and the ninth months of the primary attack. It was difficult to decide whether a particular relapse was a true relapse or a fresh infection. Altogether malaria and PUO were responsible for one half of all hospital admissions during the period [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] .
On the Indo-Burma Front fighting took place in areas notorious for a high incidence of various infectious diseases with a high annual rainfall and difficult conditions of supplies and medical services. Various illnesses accounted in 1942 for 70070 of all hospital admissions. In 1943 this figure decreased to 66%, in 1944 to 59% and in 1945 to 48070; the most important single cause of illness was malaria.
One of the interesting features of Table 1 is the great difference between the Iow incidence of malaria in African troops of the 81st Division in comparison with other troops in this Command. The Africans had between eight and thirteen times less malaria than the non-Africans; on the other hand the difference between the British and Indian troops was much less pronounced, the latter being only 10% less than in the former. 
John Hull Grundy Lecture
The Royal Navy and Air Force
In the Royal Navy malaria was not a serious problem for evident reasons. The highest rate of admissions was in 1943 when the figure was close to 11 per 1000 for all ranks, out of a total average force of 600,000 (Table 4) . Admissions for malaria to the RN Hospital at Haslar were only 3.3070 as compared with nearly 10070 in World War I.
In contradistinction, the Royal Air Force suffered heavily from malaria and the total number of cases was nearly 75,000. In the United Kingdom 5,077 cases of malaria were recorded in members of the RAF who contracted their infections, primary or relapsing, when serving abroad.
In the Far East vivax malaria was consistently more common than falciparum malaria whereas in the Middle East in 1940 and 1941 the latter was the commoner of the two; in 1942-45 in the Middle East vivax malaria showed a higher incidence. In West Africa the infections were predominently due to P. jalciparum. Quartan malaria was rare in all Commands.
Much of this wastage in the early stage of the War was due to the failure of the executive to realise that malaria Table 3 Incidence of malaria and blackwater fever in the European contingents of British Army in West Africa in group.bmj.com on November 2, 2017 -Published by http://jramc.bmj.com/ Downloaded from discipline required the active co-operation of all ranks. It was often difficult for the RAF to select camp sites of low malarial risk because the primary consideration was to find a level stretch of ground for a landing strip and the best of such sites were often in low lying, marshy districts. In many instances dress discipline was poor, officers and men bathed after dusk and failed to carry out other precautions such as the use of repellents and mosquito nets. Prophylactic mepacrine was not taken consistently. The work of malaria control squads was not effective without the full support of all unit commanders.
As in the Army so in the RAF it was the introduction of mepacrine in 1943 instead of quinine, and a better discipline of the Force that changed the situation. It also created a few problems apart from occasional adverse effects. There were widespread rumours that the new drug caused sterility and impotence. The second possibility was particularly worrying but the fears were soon dispelled. Some concern was expressed about the effect of mepacrine on flying personnel and to them this compound was not given until July 1944.
In two countries of West Africa where the RAF had important bases the RAMC carried out extensive reclamation schemes to improve the malariogenic conditions existing close to the RAF camps and airports. One was in Accra, Ghana, where a combined British-American base was operating. The other, more interesting, was near Lagos in Nigeria; it was initiated by Lt Col Gilroy, in charge of No 7 Field Malaria Laboratory. The LagosApapa swamp drainage project began in 1942, when Lagos became one of the nodal points of the little known but vital Transcontinental ATA Ferry Service of the RAF. This was organized to keep up the steady supply of front line aircraft for the Middle East when the Mediterranean sea-route was blocked by the Italians.
Fighter planes, Hurricanes mainly, were shipped in crates from Britain to West Africa. Takoradi in Ghana and Lagos in Nigeria served as main bases for the assembly and test flights of these single engine, one-man planes. From Lagos these planes were flown by civilian pilots (Canadian, French, Polish, Yugoslav; men well over 40 and several women) across Africa in small hops, with refuelling every 400-500 miles at primitive landing strips. They flew in air-caravans consisting of 6-8 planes, following the leader, a light bomber with navigational facilities. The air-route was across Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa, Sudan and then up the Nile valley to Luxor or Cairo. Several thousand planes were delivered in this way in 1943-44 with very few losses.
As early as 1941 it became evident that the Lagos airbase was situated in the immediate vicinity of a coastal mangrove swamp breeding high numbers of A. gambiae and A. melas. Up to 500 blood-fed Anopheles were collected daily in tents of an anti-aircraft battery and the weekly incidence of malaria was about 100 per 1000. In mid-1942 it was decided to drain the main swamp and as this was successful the work was soon extended to all 89 swampy lands within I mile perimeter of the airbase. The results of this work, consisting of the exclusion of high tides from the low-lying area by a sea wall provided with a tide gate, and draining the shallow swamp by a system of converging channels were excellent. Details of it will be found in Gilroy's excellent monograph 20 and in a preliminary paper by Gilroy and Bruce-Chwatt 21 . This work, planned by an RAMC unit, carried out by a Nigerian labour force, supervised by joint RAMC and RAF staff, is a rare example of a semi-permanent malaria control project completed successfully during the War22.
Australian Forces
Throughout the War malaria was an ever present problem in the Australian Forces. Cases of malaria in Palestine and in Greece in were not unduly alarming but the Syrian campaign in 1941 showed the impact of this disease in mobile operations. From August to October 1941, about 1400 cases occurred out of a total of 2331 for that whole year in the Middle East I2 ,23.
With the change of the main theatre of operations for the Australians from the Middle East to the South West Pacific in early 1942, the problem of malaria had greatly increased, not only for the military but also for the civilian authorities in Australia. In North Queensland and in the Northern Territories scattered endemic foci were present before, and the main danger lay in the massive introduction of malaria into this part of the Australian continent by troops returning from New Guinea and elsewhere. This danger became evident when in March 1942 an outbreak of malaria affected 7f1!o of the civilian population at Cairns 24 , 25. In the meantime the situation in New Guinea was grim both militarily and otherwise. The areas of endemic malaria round Port Moresby were increasing, as the previous control measures became slack; preventive measures among the troops were unsatisfactory, as shown by a sharp epidemic of malaria with 3000 cases in the Forces at Milne Bay in the south-east of the island 23 •
Another intense epidemic of falciparum and vivax malaria with 12000 cases occurred in early 1943 in Central Papua during the action against the Japanese. In March 1943 atebrin (mepacrine) was adopted and enforced as a daily preventive drug; when better curative methods were introduced the situation improved. This was largely due to the formation of special Malaria Control Units attached to forward fighting troops. Moreover, Mobile Entomological Sections were formed to provide special information on appropriate control methods.
A new policy made unit commanders personally responsible for regular chemoprophylaxis of their troops. DDT spraying was introduced at ground le"el and from the air. Consequently the alarming earlier malaria incidence of 740 per 1000 among the troops in base and forward areas fell in November 1944 to 26 • The other was that the responsibility for preventive measures rested squarely with the combatant commanders, exercising full disciplinary action when necessari 4 .
United States Army Malaria became a serious problem in the US Army in many parts of the world, as shown in Tabie 5, simplified from the data given by Mowre/ 8 in the volume produced by the Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army. Nearly 500,000 cases occurred during the four years and the highest numbers were reported in 1943- 44 . It has been estimated that altogether about 9 million mandays were lost in the US Forces during that period.
Malaria was a serious problem in North Africa ( Fig  I) ; it was prevalent in some zones of Morocco, the Con- 44 with 944,000 man-days lost. During the Sicilian campaign, the US Seventh and British Eighth Armies lost, from malaria alone, the equivalent of the fighting effectiveness of two infantry divisions. In fact there were more losses due to malaria than there were battle casualties; the US Seventh Army reported 9,892 cases of malaria and 8,375 battle casualites and the British Eighth Arml reported 11,590 and approximately 9,000 respectivelyi .
Nearly 33,000 malaria cases in the European area were (Fig. 2) .
The highest incidence was seen in India-Burma-China (Fig 3) , and in the South Pacific. Although the overall annual malaria incidence, even in these two areas, has never exceeded 250 per 1000 per year, the respective rates in some large units were much higher. The First Marine Division on Guada1canal ceased to be an effective combat 
Of the 411,000 cases of malaria contracted overseas by the US Army during the War, 65070 were due to P. vivax, 12070 were caused by P. jalciparum, 0.3070 by P. malariae and about 22070 were either mixed infections or unidentified. Malaria caused by P. vivax had the highest in- . Relapses of vivax malaria were particularly troublesome in the Mediterranean area, where they occurred in about 50070 of all cases; in the India-Burma-China area the relapse rate was 25070 and some patients had up to 10 relapses of their first attack.
There were 302 deaths due to malaria during the period 1942-45; 292 of these deaths occurred among overseas admissions of this total. 157 deaths occurred in Pacific areas (113 deaths for the South West Pacific and 44 deaths for the Central and South Pacific areas). The fatality rate of malaria (chiefly due to P. jalciparum) was of the order of 0.25070, the highest occurring in the India-Burma-China the(ltre of war.
Malaria in the Japan Imperial Army and in POW Camps
Malaria had not spared the Japanese Forces themselves; in the Japanese 14th Army between [10] [11] [12] ,000 soldiers were ill in 1942 after the attack on Bataan; in New Guinea about 37070 of their average strength of 80,000 were incapacitated by malaria in 1943, with an estimated rate of 1440 per 1000 per year28. No-one will ever know to what extent malaria alone had contributed to the appalling morbidity and mortality rate of British and Australian prisoners-of-war in the Far East. The official statistics of 1946 report that the total number of British and Australian Army personnel taken prisoner by the Japanese was around 43,000, of whom 11,000 died or were killed in captivity3,18.
Much more could be said about the infamous POW camps of Changi and Kranji in Malaya where some 30,000 British and Australian Army prisoners were kept for 3 years, in dreadful conditions. It is estimated that not less than 6950 of them had malaria and some 700 died of its direct or indirect effects 3 *. The same situation was reported in Filipino-American prisoners of war held in various camps after the loss of Bataan; of 30.000 deaths that occurred in 1942 in two main camps about one quarter were due to malaria l8 •
Malaria during the Korean and Vietnam Wars
The military operations in Korea and South-East Asia opened a new chapter in the modern history of malaria in war. Few reports on these campaigns are available and only sketchy data prove that once again tropical disease generally and malaria in particular could inflict enormous losses on troops, even if some attempts are made at their protection.
Between 1945 and 1954 the French had in Indochina an annual average strength of 100,000 for the Metropolitan forces and 78,000 for their allied indigenous troops. There were 294,000 malarial cases during the 9 year campaign though only 70,400 required hospitalization. Quinine and mepacrine were used as a prophylactic during the early period but gave way to proguanil and in 1952 to chloroquine at 300 mg base once a week. 29 •
It has been said that the prevalence of malaria among the Viet Cong units was between 50-75 per cent; in some groups of prisoners the incidence of malaria was so high that raids on plantations and dispensaries were made to obtain supplies of drugs.
Apparently, in 1965 about 1070 of USA military personnel in Vietnam were ac~uiring malaria for every day they spent in the war area 3 . Already at the end of that year the monthly number of cases of malaria in the US Forces reached nearly 800 and equalled the number of . *Footnote After the occupation of Malaya by the Japanese, the Institute for Medical Research in Kuala Lumpur was transferred to Singapore, where most of its equipment and archives were lost. Several staff members were ·killed, Major J A Reid and Dr T Wilson became prisoners in Changi camp and were then sent with the ill-fated "F" Force to build the notorious Siamese railway line. The Sixth Malaria Field Laboratory under Lt Col Strahan attached to the Institute in 1941, was unable to deploy before the invasion and most of its staff were taken prisonersof-war. But the team remained active till the last and one of its final tasks was to collect all the mepacrine tablets they could collect from rubber estates and mines, for the protection of troops. Some 2 million tablets were th~s collected and I!10st of this supply was used for treatment of pnsoners at Changl camp. 
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• The fatality rate of P. Jalciparum malaria (0.3070) was low because of the excellence of treatment. However, clinical problems encountered with resistance of the parasite to chloroquine were serious. Moreover, during the years 1966 and 1970 not less than 14,120 cases of imported malaria occurred in the USA, mainly in military personnel returning from Vietnam; over 80070 of them were due to P. vivax and 12070 to P. jalciparum. Obviously the majority of cases of vivax malaria were relapses of infections acquired in Vietnam 33 . The diagnosis of malaria was difficult since irregular taking of prophylactic drugs made a single blood examination unreliable and it had become a practice to take [4] [5] [6] blood films during the first one or two days after hospital admission, before the diagnosis of malaria infection could be confirmed. Thus the true incidence of this infection was probably higher than indicated in official records (Fig 4) 34.35.
The major (over 85070) proportion of malaria cases occurring in Vietnam was due to P. Jalciparum and resistance of some Vietnam strains of this species to chloroquine was probably one of the factors responsible for the high incidence of malaria. However the taking of antimalarial prophylactic drugs in the US Forces was unsatisfactory and, whenever the supervision improved, the incidence of malaria decreased 36 .
An interesting observation made in Vietnam during the study of resistant falciparum malaria in the US Army was the difference of the course of infection between white and black American troopS37. Thus the initial attack rate in the black (Negro) ethnic group was 7.9070 instead of the expected 11.7070 although the exposure to malaria infection was about equal. Moreover, only 4.4070 of them had a recrudescence after treatment (while the expected rate was 11.7070) and none had a severely resistant infection. The duration of fever after the start of treatment was less in black soldiers than in white.
Although malaria in the British Commonwealth forces that were operating in the war area of South-East Asia has been lower than that estimated for the US Army, the direct comparison· is injudicious because of different strengths of units, different .areas of operations and different degrees of exposure. Contingents of the Australian The incidence of malaria in the Brit ish Forces operating in the Far East between 1960 and 1970 was not undul y hig h; the total number of ca ses was just under 1,000 and t he a nnu al inc iden ce varied betwee n 3 and 12 per 1000 per yea r with peaks of over 10 pe r 1000 in 196 1 and 1969.
These figures a re based on the total numbers of personne l, in cluding those stati o ned at the base headquarters and in no n -mala rious areas. If the incidence of malaria is calcula ted o n ly for troops exposed to risk the re levant figures wilt be higher40.~' . '4.
In compa ri so n with t he data from the Far East, t he in cidence of malaria in the British Forces serving during the sam e period in the Persian Gulf area was ve ry mu ch lower, averaging a bout 3 per lOOO per year with peaks of [5] [6] [7] 
III Present problems of malaria preve ntion
The lessons of malari a in the Second World W ar have been quoted succi nctl y by D r Paul F Russe ll, the great American malariologist responsible for much o r the successful prevention of illness in the US Fo rces in seve ra l pans or the world: " The directives, o rgan izat ion , cooperation, integ ratio n, training and s kill, sup pl y a nd transp on have as mu ch meanin g in malarial contro l as in any other phase of warfare. These factors and above all a ma laria·con sciousness of the high comma nd and of t he troops themse lves are cssential,,4 z .
In more o r less static base-units the d egree of potentia l exposure to ma laria depends o n local epidemiological conditions: thi s means on the camp-site , closeness to large mosquito-breeding a reas a nd on the type of military habitations . An appraisal of the sit uat ion demands a modicum of knowled ge of the amount of ma la ri a in the group.bmj.com on November 2, 2017 -Published by http://jramc.bmj.com/ Downloaded from local population, as well as of (he type and behaviour characteristics of the Anopheles vector. Much of this information may have to be collected ad hoc through rapid reconnaissance surveys, which are part of the tactical intelligence, nOt less important than the awareness of the disposition of enemy units.
In such base camps the use of collective means of prevention by environmental manipulation, larvicidcs or residual spraying may have some effect, providing that these measures are carried out to perfection and supported by the authority of the local commander. However, no single method, whether collective or individual, such as insecticid e spraying, screening of lcnts and huts, use of bed-nets, repellents, chemoprophylaxis etc. will give complete protection. Only the application of all these measures may provide a relative freedom from infection.· Although at present. malaria has virtually disappeared from Europe, Australia. much of the Mediterranean, North America, most of South Africa, the Caribbean and from some parts of South America, yet the situatio n in south and sOUlh-east Asia. Indonesia, the Wesl Pacific, New Guinea, Central America and the \.vhole of tropical Africa is probably worse than during the Second \Vorld War (Fig. 5 ). This is due to the fact that our previous technical methods of attack on the malaria parasite and on its vector have lost their cutting edgc 43 • .:I4.
Resistance of Anopheles. first to DOT and then to other insecticides, has assumed a world-wide dimension. The Fifth Report of the WHO Expert Committee on Vector Biology and Control (1980) noted that 51 species of Anopheles arc now resistant to one or more insecticides: 34 species are resistant to DOT, 47 to dieldrin and 30 to both these compounds. Ten species are resistant to organophosphates, such as malathion and 4 to carbamates. Moreover. some strains of Anopheles sacharovi and A. gambiae are resistam to pyrethroids, the newest products of modern synt hetic chemistry. The development of DOT and dieldrin-resistance in the major vector species has created "problem areas", where malaria control and eradication are severely handicapped. in the following parts of the world:
\Vestern Asia: DDT-and Multiple resistance in the vectors of malaria, particularly in a reas where intense use of pesticides is made in agriculture, has been of great concern in recent years. Several species of mosquitoes are often found breeding in agricultural areas and are liable to be exposed to the insecticides employed in crop spraying. However, this also results in suppression of the natural enemies of mosquitoes and exerts a high selection pressure for frequent development of mosquito resistance to insecticides 46 . The increasingly complex genetic and biochemical factors of the resistance phenomenon make it difficult to forecast the response of a given mosquito population in any area at a given lime; at best only a partial effect can be hoped for. The relevance of this to the logistics of supplies is evident 47 • Few new insectides are being produced, since the chemical industry is reluctant to embark on the costly and chancy process of development, foUolVed by lengthy toxicity trials and the opprobrium of the environmental lobby. Genetic methods of cont rol have been disappointing and biological larvicides such as B. tIlUringiensis or B.sphaericus are of limited usc.
It is obvious that in any mobile military operation mOSt of the above methods of co ntrol cannot be applied and
The General Routine Order issued in September 1944 by the Commander Allied Land Forces in SOllth West Pacific Area reads as follow: "a) Commanding Officers will be held pcrsonally responsible for ensuring the strict observance (of antimalarial precautions) and they, and all other officers, will at all limes be vigilant and unremitting in th e enforcement of such instructions (contained in this Order). b) Neglect to comply with such instructions will be treated as a serious offcnce and will be punished accordingly. c) The occurrence of cases of malaria in a unit which has been directed to take the dosage of a!ebrin prescribed in lhis Order will be regarded as prima jocie evidence tha! the Commanding Officer has failed 10 ensure the observance of such inSlrucl ions." chemoprophylaxis of malaria is then ti)e last and best resort. Herein lies one of the main problems involving the human factor. All individual methods of protection depend forcibly on the individual, be it wearing proper clothing, using repellents or taking antimalarial drugs. Training in the use of these methods, supervision of medical authorities and responsibility of the commanding officer may secure success 48 . Unfortunately one of the lessons of the past was that the value of these simple measures is fully recognised only after they have been disregarded 49 .
The cruellest blow of the past 20 years was the appearance of resistance of P.falciparum to chloroquine and other 4-aminoquinolines, first reported from northern areas of South America, and soon observed in South-East Asia 50 . This resistance caused much trouble in 1965 when the US Army was using as a malaria prophylactic a combination of chloroquine and primaquine known as the CP tablet. As many as 26,000 cases of malaria occurred among the Americans in Vietnam during the period 1965-68 due to resistance of P. jalciparum, although deliberate avoidance of chemoprophylaxis, to fall ill and get out, was not uncommon 51 .
In 1966, when it was obvious that this prophylactic regimen was inadequate, a daily dose of 25 mg of DDS (dapsone) was added to the two combined drugs. This halved the malaria attack rates in Army units where the malaria discipline was good but made little difference in units where the taking of prophylactic antimalarials was defective 52.53. The taking of DDS created problems of toxICity and particularly the appearance of methemoglobinaemia, especially in individuals with G6PD deficiency.
Men returning to the USA were instructed to take the CP tablet containing 300 mg chloroquine and 45 mg primaquine once a week for eight weeks after their return. The value of this radical treatment for prevention of relapses of vivax malaria has been generally confirmed but there is evidence that a large number of all ranks' did not follow the prescribed regimen and the mean 'relapse rate for P. vivax averaged 20070 54 . About 70% of returning troops failed to complete the full 8 weeks course of radical treatment. The rate of failure among officers and other ranks was almost equal and common reasons given were forgetting to take the tablets, losing them or various side-effects. A survey33 suggested that the official figure of 1 malaria relapse case in 200 soldiers returning from Vietnam was in fact much higher.
The regimen of antimalarial prophylaxis followed in the Australian contingent in Vietnam consisted of daily 200 mg of proguanil with the addition of 25 mg of DDS during the brief period when the peak of malaria incidence is expected. The results of this method have been satisfactory, as the seasonal peaks of malaria at the end of 1969 and 1970 had not materialized 38 .
Among British Commonwealth Forces operating in South-East Asia the possibility of chloroquine resistant malaria was first mooted in 1962 in units operating along the Malaya-Thailand border 55 . The incidence of malaria in these units was not unduly high, but the danger of chloroquine resistance was sufficient to stimulate a number of studies, particularly by McKelvey et aI 56 . 57 . These studies confirmed that strains of P. jalciparum with a varying degree of resistance to 4-arninoquinolines were present in a number of areas of West Malaysia and in Singapore. Some 50070 of patients exhibited a low degree of chloroquine resistance which responded to higher than usual dosage of the drug.
Introduction of a combination of sulfonamides or sulfones with pyrimethamine at the end of the 1960's was an important step, too late to play any major role in the military history of the Vietnam conflict. Sulfadoxine with pyrimethamine (generally known as Fansidar) and other similar mixed compounds have been very useful for treatment of P. jalciparum infections resistant to chloroquine: P. vivax does not respond very well to this drug. Initially limited to treatment of malaria, the various sulfonamide/pyrimethamine formulations yielded to commercial pressures and became widely used for prophylaxis with expected consequences. Over the past few years Fansidar has been losing its effectiveness for treatment of P. jalciparum malaria in South-East Asia and in Brazil as also in other countries of South America5o.58.59.
The degree and extent of chloroquine resistance in P. jalciparum in various parts of the world can now be followed up better thanks to the development of in vitro culture of this parasite 60 and to the use of a standardized method for evaluation of the response of various strains to specific drugs 61 . This method has allowed for a reliable monitoring of the global situation (Fig. 6 ). This resistance of P. jalciparum to chloroquine and other 4-aminoquinolines extends now from South-East Asia to a large part of the Indian peninsula and eastwards to vast areas of the Western Pacific including the Philippines, parts of Indonesia, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu; it is also present in southern China. In South America foci of resistance exist in most of the countries north of the 15°S and also in some parts of Central America62.63.64,5o.
The situation in tropical Africa causes acute concern. There is now evidence of chloroquine resistance in large parts of East Africa; recent reports indicate the presence of foci of chloroquine resistance also in Central Africa. All this brought to the fore the use of quinine with tetracycline or clindamycine for treatment of severe falciparum malaria, although both chloroquine and Fansidar are still of value in many parts of the tropics. The same applies to chemoprophylaxis, where the two latter drugs are still indicated although much confusion about their use exists even among the experts. It seems that even quinine is now less effective for treatment of falciparum malaria in South-East Asia. Thus we are in urgent need of an active blood schizontocidal drug which would maintain its effect for at least one month after a single oral dose. We also need a well tolerated radical-cure compound,free of side-effects, for prevention of relapses of P. vivax and P. ovale infections, when given at a single dose or at most, for three days.
Fortunately there is no evidence that resistance to chloroquine or quinine of Plasmodia other than P. jalciparum has developed anywhere.
The dark cloud that now covers the horizon of treatment and prevention of falciparum malaria has however a silver lining. It has increased the amount of fundamental and applied research to a remarkable degree. A stupendous effort has been made in the U.S. by the Waiter Reed Army Institute of Research which over the past 10 years has screened well over 250,000 various compounds as possible antimalarial drugs. Of these only a handful of promising new compounds have emerged, but some of them are of real value. Outstanding among these is a quinoline-methanol (WA 142490) now known as mefloquine. One of the reasons for the small yield of candidate antimalarials, revealed after a decade of this remarkable effort of the Waiter Reed Institute, is the amount and complexity of preclinical information now required for potential human trials. Large numbers of compounds can be screened on rodent malaria models, but then must be also evaluated on P. jalciparum-Aotus monkey models. Other drug-testing systems such as the in vitro screening against various strains of P. jalciparum have now improved the predictive ability of experimental research.
Mefloquine underwent a number of clinical and field trials; it proved to be an excellent schizontocidal compound, very similar to quinine although with a slower action. However, because of its chemical closeness to chloroquine there is a likelihood of development of crossresistance by P. jalciparum. In fact some cases of such rp~;~t~nrp h!:lvP ~lrp!:lrlv hppn nht.PTvprl in "nl1th_t=:~~t At.i~ Because of this, the present policy is to restrict the use of mefloquine alone and to release it for prophylaxis and treatment only as a combination with sulphadoxine and pyrimethamine, to prevent or delay the appearance of resistance.
Another potentially useful compound selected by the US Army research group is a 9-phenanthrenemethanol (W A 122, 455) known as halofantrene which is undergoing a series of trials. At least four other compounds also merit further studies.
Animal models and especially those tbased on the use of Aotus monkeys for various strains of P. jalciparum and P. vivax and also those based on sporozoite infections of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulala) with P. cynomolgi have been most useful for the discovery of a series of : a) blood schizontocidal drugs more active than chloroquine and b) tissue schizontocidal compounds better than primaquine 66 • This allowed for evaluation of radical curative activity against P. vivax of some 200 compounds of which 19 were as active as primaquine and 15 two to four times more active. This suggests that much progress has been made towards a three-day cure of relapsing infections.
Intensive efforts aiming at the discovery of new and better anti-malarial drugs continue in many parts of the world. Stimulation and remarkable co-ordination of this activity is carried out by the WHO Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases. Much information on the recent progress and future possibilities of chemotherapy of malaria will be found in the latest WHO Report 6 7, the main points of which can be summarised as follows: I) The current methods of assessing the trends of resistance of malaria parasites to drugs should be simplified and much more widely used; 2) The drugs and drug combinations, especially those that have an effective range of activity, must not be used haphazardly for prevention or treatment of malaria, but subjected to some limitations to prevent the spread of resistant strains of Plasmodia.
3) The research on new compounds and their clinical trials should be speeded up, with a view to developing drugs for the radical cure of multiple resistant P. jalciparum, for the radical cure of relapsing P. vivax and for causal prophylaxis of all species of human Plasmodia.
One of the new major advances has been made by Chinese scientists who described recently a number of derivatives of Qinghaosu, a plant known as Artemisia annua, used for centuries in traditional Chinese medicine.
A compound artemisinine, actually a sesquiterpene lactone, synthesized by Chinese chemists is an effecive antimalarial. A better tolerated artesunate, a soluble ester of the main principle seems to be quite promising. Larger field trials on these two compounds are now in progress 59 •
No douht. nrosoects of develooing new and better 97 drugs for treatment and prevention of malaria are now brighter than five years ago. When it comes to prevention, no-one can predict whether the best hopes for the future lie with chemotherapeutic or immunological methods. Much has been said, written and expected from a prospective malaria vaccine and recent progress of immunology justifies many hopes. Three types of antigens are being investigated: attenuated sporozoites, purified erythrocytic merozoites or their products and gametocytes, the latter to block the development of parasites in the insect vector. Modern immunological methods such as monoclonal antibodies or radioisotope labelling of specific peptides enable us to identify the protective antigen suitable for preparation of vaccines. Moreover, recombinant DNA techniques make it possible to clone-the antigen-producing genes into bacteria so that sufficient amounts of vaccines could be produced. An ideal vaccine should be polyvalent for at least two species of Plasmodia, fully protective for at least a year, simple in application, free of side effects and economical in use. Although the present prospects for it are optimistic, many years of trials will be needed. It seems that in this contest between new drugs and vaccination the former have an historical advantage, while the latter may yet spring a surprise or two. Prediction is a risky business, especially as the future is not what it used to be. One thing is more predictable, however; namely that any military operation involving troops in tropical parts of the world will face almost the same dangers that armies confronted during the past two major wars 68 . 69
• Tropical diseases are still as prevalent as they were 50 years ago. Although some methods of preventive medicine have improved, others have lost their former use through the evolutionary adaptation of pathogens and vectors 
